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Many firms require consumers, employees, and suppliers to sign class
action waivers as a condition of doing business with the firm, and the U.S.
Supreme Court has endorsed companies’ ability to block class actions
through mandatory individual arbitration clauses. Are class action waivers
serving the interests of society or are they facilitating socially harmful business practices? This paper synthesizes and extends the existing law and
economics literature by analyzing the firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers. While in many settings the firms’ incentive to block class actions may be aligned with maximizing social welfare, in many other settings
it is not. We examine conditions in which class action waivers can compromise product safety, facilitate anticompetitive conduct, and support harmful employment practices. Our analysis delivers a more nuanced, policybased critique of the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, highlights several
new unresolved issues, and identifies future challenges for legal scholarship to address.
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Introduction
The class action is a mechanism that allows plaintiffs who have been
harmed by a common defendant to aggregate their claims and pursue a
single collective action rather than many individual actions.1 In an attempt
to avoid class actions, many firms require consumers, employees, and suppliers to sign class action waivers as a condition of doing business with the
firm.2 Some waivers prevent consumers from pursuing class actions alleging false advertising, product defects and malpractice, and antitrust violations.3 Other waivers prevent employees from joining together and pursuing claims of discrimination or other workplace violations.4 In the
securities law context, a class action waiver can prevent investors from
jointly bringing lawsuits alleging fraudulent earnings statements or selfdealing by managers.
Notwithstanding the importance of class action waivers, previous law
and economics literature has focused largely on the ex-post incentives of
potential plaintiffs and their lawyers to pursue class actions and has ignored the incentives of potential defendants to block class actions ex ante
with class action waivers.5 Are class action waivers serving the interests of
1.
We use the phrases “class action” and “class action waiver” broadly to include multidistrict litigation (MDL) consolidations of individual lawsuits, class arbitration, and other methods
for aggregating legal claims for the adjudication of common questions of law and fact. The differences among these mechanisms are not relevant for our analysis. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 18-20,
23 (outlining the federal rules for joinder and class actions).
2.
The 2020 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey reports that 77.1% of companies use
arbitration clauses in their contracts and 55.0% of these include class action waivers. 2020 Carlton
Fields Class Action Survey, CARLTON FIELDS 5 (2020), https://classactionsurvey.com
[https://perma.cc/2RBY-U8KL]. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Arbitration Study, “Tens of millions of consumers use consumer financial products or services that are
subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses,” and nearly all prohibit arbitration on a class basis. Ar-

bitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION B UREAU 9 (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYX5-CQX8].
3.
Arbitration can differ substantially from litigation in terms of costs, procedures, and
damage awards (among others). For in-depth discussions of collective action waivers, see generally
Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, 104 MICH. L. R EV. 373 (2005); and Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
4.
Some estimate that 20% of employees are covered by mandatory arbitration clauses.
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the
Sound and Fury, 11 E MP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405 (2007).
5.
Many scholars argue that class actions allow plaintiffs to avoid duplication of expenses
and achieve economies of scale. This is particularly valuable when the harms that the plaintiffs
have suffered are very small relative to the costs of litigation, because in such cases individual
actions would have negative expected value (NEV). See generally Robert G. Bone, Class Action,
in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 67 (Chris
William Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 2012); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 60 (1975); Geoffrey P. Miller, Class
Actions, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 257 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Class actions are also valuable when individual claims have positive expected value
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society by avoiding wasteful litigation and rent-seeking by lawyers?6 Or are
they blocking meritorious legal claims and facilitating socially harmful
business practices? These issues are of practical as well as academic interest. The importance of class action waivers has come to the fore through
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, such as Concepcion,7 Italian Colors,8 and
Epic Systems,9 that have largely endorsed companies’ ability to block class
actions through mandatory individual arbitration clauses.
This paper builds on the existing law and economics literature10 by
focusing on the defendant-firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers
on potential plaintiffs. We foremost identify conditions under which a
firm’s private incentive to block or allow class actions may or may not be
aligned with maximizing social welfare.11 We also suggest what the law can
do when a firm’s private incentive is not aligned with the interest of society.
Our analysis delivers a more nuanced, policy-based understanding of the
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases and identifies several new unresolved issues and future challenges for legal scholarship.
We present our arguments using a series of illustrative examples to
demonstrate the effects of class action waivers. Class action waivers prevent plaintiffs from achieving economies of scale and other efficiencies in
litigation, but also potentially limit the value captured by lawyers and third
(PEV) insofar as class actions reduce the per-plaintiff costs of litigation or allow the plaintiffs to
optimize their investments. See David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305, 347-48 (2014). For an
earlier analysis on class action waivers, see generally Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Class
Actions and Class Action Waivers, 23 SUP. CT. E CON. REV. 305 (2015).
6.
According to Beisner et al., “One of the most heavily criticized class-action abuses has
been the use of class-action settlements to generate huge fees for lawyers and little or nothing for
the allegedly injured consumers.” John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller,
Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1445
(2005). But see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2043 (2010).
7.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). The case dealt with mandatory individual arbitration provisions in cell phone service contracts. The U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the lower court’s ruling that such provisions were “unconscionable” under California
contract law.
8.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). The plaintiffs argued that
American Express was exercising monopoly power over charge cards to force retailers to accept
higher fees on American Express’s credit cards. Although the plaintiffs argued that bringing individual antitrust arbitrations, in accordance with the credit card service agreements, would be prohibitively costly, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs still retained the right to pursue the antitrust
remedy.
9.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). In that case, the Court ruled that
mandating individual arbitration on plaintiff-employees (pursuant to the employment agreement)
did not violate the National Labor Relations Act, notwithstanding an earlier, contrary interpretation by the National Labor Relations Board.
10.
See supra note 5.
11.
As is standard in the law and economics literature, our measure of social welfare is
simply the aggregate value captured by the actors in the economy (firms, consumers, lawyers). We
do not consider distributional consequences of legal rules or notions of fairness and morality. For
a thoughtful discussion of the normative analysis of legal rules see STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 663-72 (2004).
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parties. Most (but not all) of our illustrative examples focus on settings
where class action lawsuits are financially viable but individual lawsuits are
not (because the cost of bringing an individual claim exceeds the potential
damage award at trial). In these examples, the class action waiver operates
as a de facto waiver of liability.12
We show that in well-functioning markets with sophisticated consumers, the firms’ incentive to allow class actions or block them by requiring
consumers to sign waivers at the time of purchase is aligned with social
welfare. If the costs of litigation are significant and there are few offsetting
benefits from litigation, litigation is likely a social waste. If firms already
have adequate incentives to manufacture safe products and provide appropriate working conditions, perhaps through market and regulatory monitoring mechanisms, class action waivers would be privately and socially desirable. Allowing class actions would lead to wasteful litigation spending,
thereby decreasing social welfare. When firms do not already have adequate incentives and imposing liability on the firms is necessary to induce
the firms to make unobservable safety investments, so long as the consumers rationally expect the consequences of the liability system, firms will voluntarily choose the dispute resolution format that solves the deterrence
problem at the lowest cost possible. In these cases, both the firm and the
consumers get to share the increase in social surplus from choosing the optimal dispute resolution forum.13
When markets are not well-functioning, however, then firms’ private
incentive to block class actions by requiring consumers to sign class action
waivers may be socially excessive. By blocking class actions and chilling
litigation, firms can exploit market failures and divert value from consumers and employees to the detriment of society. When consumers misperceive the impact of signing a class action waiver, or are unaware that they
are signing one,14 the price that consumers are willing to pay for the product will not adjust to reflect the presence or absence of a class action
waiver. In this case, firms will impose class action waivers as a cost savings
device, and product safety and reliability may be compromised. Furthermore, in market settings where regulations are necessary to avoid corpo-

12.
More generally, plaintiffs may have an excessive or insufficient incentive to sue. See
generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997).
13.
According to the Coase Theorem, in settings without transactions costs or other impediments, the assignment of property rights should not matter. Private parties would negotiate
to an economically efficient outcome. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1960).
14.
For evidence that individuals do not read the fine print in contracts, see Yannis
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014).
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rate misconduct (such as antitrust and employment laws) but public enforcement mechanisms are weak, class actions may be socially desirable.15
Private lawsuits brought against firms that engage in illegal price fixing, or
against employers that breach their duties towards workers, can be a critical complement to public enforcement efforts.16 Unlike the earlier set of
cases, the reason the firm’s incentives are not aligned is that the firm does
not capture any increase in surplus from choosing the socially optimal dispute resolution system.
The Essay is organized as follows. Part I introduces our basic framework and presents a simple benchmark example to anchor the analysis.
Part II presents a series of variations of the benchmark example to demonstrate how firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers may or may not
be aligned with maximizing social welfare. Part III provides an informal
discussion of other important wrinkles and complications, including potential agency problems and possible frivolous lawsuits engendered by class
actions. The Conclusion provides some thoughts for future research.
I. Basic Framework
This Essay presents simple, numerical examples to examine a firm’s
incentive to allow class actions or block them by requiring consumers to
sign class action waivers. Our primary focus is on settings where individual
lawsuits have negative expected value (NEV) but class actions have positive expected value (PEV).17 For example, a consumer who entered into a
contract with AT&T Mobility for cellular telephone service would probably not find it worthwhile to pursue an individual claim if the likely gross
recovery is on the order of $30.18 It may be worthwhile, however, for one
million similarly situated consumers to join their claims and pursue litigation as a class action. By doing so, they will be able to achieve sufficient
economies of scale on the cost of litigation which, in turn, would transform
their claim into one with PEV. When individual lawsuits have a NEV, a
class action waiver will effectively block litigation against the firm and
function as a de facto liability waiver. Although it is not our primary focus,
15.
Many scholars have explored the choice between private and public enforcement of
law. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus
Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
16.
See DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT (2011), for a discussion of public and private antitrust enforcement.
17.
The Supreme Court extolled the class-action mechanism in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“[A]ggrieved persons may be without any effective
redress unless they may employ the class action device.”).
18.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Concepcion, writes, “What rational lawyer would
have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from
a $30.22 claim?” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Concepcions were
charged $30.22 in sales tax on two phones. Id. at 1761-62.
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we will also discuss settings where individual lawsuits have PEV and class
actions allow plaintiffs to realize economies of scale.19
Many of the ideas in this Essay will be illustrated through the lens of
products liability.20 In particular, we will explore contractual clauses that
prevent consumers who have suffered a loss due to defective products from
aggregating their claims and bringing a single action against the manufacturers of these products.21 To anchor our analysis, we begin with a very
simple benchmark of a monopolist (the “firm”) that sells a product that
could harm consumers.22 The marginal cost of production is assumed to be
$100. The product malfunctions at a rate of 10% per unit, causing (monetized) harm to the consumer of $1,000, so the “average” or expected harm
associated with each unit of the product sold is 10% of $1,000 or $100.23
We assume that if the firm were to be sued by the consumers under strict
products liability, the firm is guaranteed to be found liable for the harm of
$1,000, so the only question is whether the harmed consumers find it worthwhile to bring suit.
Suppose the lawsuits brought on an individual basis have NEV: an
individual consumer’s cost of litigating a products liability claim is greater
than the potential damage award. So, without class actions, consumers
themselves must bear the accident costs and forego compensation. On the
other hand, class actions have a PEV due to economies of scale. For simplicity, when class actions are allowed the litigation costs (for both consumers and the firm) fall to zero. So, when class actions are allowed, consumers
who have suffered harm bring a class action and are made whole through
litigation. We also assume that consumers are risk neutral, sophisticated
and understand the risks that the product poses, and that there are no actions that the consumers or the firm can take to reduce the probability of
an accident or mitigate the degree of harm. We will relax these assumptions later.

19.
For empirical evidence of economies of scale, see generally Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010); and Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. E MPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010).
20.
Recent estimates suggest that products liability accounted for 11.6% of U.S. corporate class actions matters and 9.4% of U.S. corporate legal defense spending in 2020. Consumer
fraud accounted for 16.0% of matters and 15.6% of spending. CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 2, at
15.
21.
The harms could include personal injury or economic damages, such as price overcharges in the Volkswagen diesel emissions litigation. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing,
Volkswagen to Pay $14.7 Billion to Settle Diesel Claims in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/business/volkswagen-settlement-diesel-scandal.html
[https://perma.cc/283W-45UJ].
22.
We focus on the monopoly (and monopsony) cases to simplify the analysis. The main
thesis will stay the same even if we were to assume a competitive market structure.
23.
The expected value is the probability of the harm multiplied by the amount of the
harm. It is the average harm that someone would suffer if repeatedly exposed to the risky product.
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Figure 1. Benchmark Example (Zero Class Action Litigation Costs,
Sophisticated Consumers, No Moral Hazard)

Figure 1A shows the market outcome when the firm accepts liability
and does not require consumers to sign a class action waiver as a condition
of purchase. The firm’s cost of selling a unit of the product is cost of manufacturing the product plus the expected future expected liability, $100 +
$100 = $200. This is represented by the horizontal line labeled “MC” for
marginal cost. The demand curve, labeled “D,” shows the gross willingness
to pay of the consumers for the product and is represented by the linear
relationship of P = $400 – Q. Since the consumers (rationally) expect to be
made whole after suffering accidents (through strict liability and zero litigation cost), their willingness to pay does not reflect their future harms. In
Figure 1A, the firm charges a price P = $300 and sells Q = 100 units of the
product.
Figure 1A shows that the sale of the product creates economic value.
The shaded rectangle in Figure 1A is the producer surplus, the firm’s profit
margin, P – MC = $300 ‒ $200 = $100 times the quantity sold, Q = 100, or
$10,000. This is the net economic value that the firm gets from producing
and selling the product. The shaded triangle in Figure 1A is the consumer
surplus, or net economic value that consumers get from consuming the
product. This is the aggregation of the very most that consumers would
have been willing to pay for the product minus the price that they actually
paid. The consumer surplus triangle has an area of $5,000. The total surplus
when class actions are allowed, $10,000 + $5,000 = $15,000, is shared by the
firm and the consumers. Notice that the firm captures two thirds of the
total surplus and the consumers receive one third.24

24.
This follows from the geometry of the example which includes a linear demand curve
and constant marginal cost.
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Figure 1B shows the market outcome when the firm requires consumers to sign a class action waiver. Since class actions are blocked and individual lawsuits are prohibitively costly by assumption, this effectively
“snuffs out” all future litigation and is equivalent to giving a liability waiver
to the firm. Comparing Figure 1B to Figure 1A, we see that there are two
differences. First, since the firm does not face future liability, their marginal cost is simply the manufacturing cost of $100 per unit. Second, consumers are not made whole through litigation. Each consumer bears an
expected loss of $100 (= 0.1 × $1000). So, each consumer’s willingness to
pay is $100 lower compared to the situation in Figure 1A. For example, a
consumer who would be willing to pay $400 for the product if the losses
were fully compensated is willing to pay $300 if their losses are uncompensated. The marginal cost curve and the demand curve are both shifting
down by exactly the same amount of $100. Consequently, the price charged
by the firm is $100 lower, too: P = $200 in Figure 1B instead of $300 in
Figure 1A.
Importantly, in our benchmark example, the decision of the firm to
allow or block class actions has no effect on the either the quantity sold (Q
= 100), the firm’s profits, or the consumer surplus. Intuitively, in a world
without transactions costs, products liability reflects a simple ex-post transfer of value of $100 from the firm to each consumer. This transfer of value
is reflected in the ex-ante market price, which is $100 higher in Figure 1A.
In Figures 1A and 1B, the producer surplus is $10,000 and the consumer
surplus is $5,000. The overall division of value between the firm and the
consumers is unchanged, too, with the firm capturing two thirds of the social surplus. Class action waivers serve no private or social purpose in our
benchmark example, and so there is no need to regulate their use.
II. Illustrative Examples
The benchmark example above relied on several very strong assumptions: zero litigation costs, sophisticated consumers who understand the
product risks, and no moral hazard on the part of the firm.25 When these
assumptions are relaxed, then liability can have profound effects on the
both the “size of the pie” and the allocation of the surplus between the firm
and consumers. This will, in turn, have an implication on whether it is in
the firm’s private incentive to allow or disallow class actions and whether
such private incentive is aligned with social welfare.
We now explore a series of variations of the preceding benchmark example. The first set of variations explores settings where the private ex ante
incentive of the firm to block class actions is aligned with the interests of
25.
Our benchmark example also assumed risk-neutral consumers. In the absence of
well-functioning insurance markets, products liability has the desirable property of shifting risk
from risk-averse consumers towards the firm. We will discuss the implications of risk-averse consumers in Part I.D.
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society. In these examples, the value created (or destroyed) by blocking
class actions is shared with consumers and suppliers. The second set of variations explores settings where the private and social interests are not
aligned. In particular, by blocking class action litigation, firms may profitably divert value from consumers, employees, and suppliers, at the expense
of economic efficiency and social welfare.

A. Private and Social Incentives Aligned
In the benchmark case with no transactions cost, both the firm and the
consumers were indifferent about whether to allow class actions. In this
Section, we relax some of the strong assumptions embedded in the benchmark case to examine circumstances in which class actions have an impact
on the market outcome. We first relax the assumptions of no (or prohibitively high) litigation costs. Next, we relax the assumption that the product
risks are known and examine the problem of the firm’s moral hazard. We
will show that the firm is no longer indifferent between blocking and allowing class actions. However, so long as consumers are sophisticated and
do not misperceive product risks, the firm’s decision to block or allow class
action litigation will be aligned with the interests of consumers.
1. Costly Litigation
Figure 2 extends our benchmark example in Figure 1 to include costs
of litigation. Suppose that the consumer-plaintiffs’ cost bringing a class action is $100 per consumer and the firm’s cost of litigation is also $100 (per
consumer). The consumers will file a class action once they suffer harm
since the net return from litigation is positive. Since loss happens 10% of
the time, this corresponds to an expected litigation cost of (0.1) × $100 =
$10 for the consumer and for the firm, each. On the other hand, as before,
with class action waivers, it is prohibitively costly for the consumers to
bring an individual lawsuit: an individual lawsuit costs more than $1,000
per consumer and has a NEV.
The market outcome when class actions are allowed is shown in Figure 2A. Notice that, compared to the benchmark in Figure 1A, the demand
curve has shifted down by $10 and the firm’s marginal cost curve has shifted
up by $10, reflecting the expected litigation costs. The market price is $300
in both figures, but producer surplus is $8,100 instead of $10,000, and the
consumer surplus is $4,050 instead of $5,000.26 The firm and the consumers
are both better off when class actions are blocked, as shown in Figure 2B.
If the firm requires consumers to sign class action waivers as a condition of
sale, no lawsuits are brought and so there are no transactions costs. This
saves expected costs of $10 + $10 = $20 per unit sold, and the total surplus
26.

As before, the producer surplus is two thirds of the social surplus.
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rises from $12,150 to $15,000. The extra surplus created when class actions
are blocked, $15,000 ‒ $12,150 = $2,850 in this example, is shared by the
firm and the consumers.

Figure 2. Costly Litigation

As a general matter, if class actions are costly and have no offsetting
social benefits, the firms’ decision to require consumers to waive their
rights to bring class actions is good for consumers, too.27 In the example
above, since individual lawsuits have NEV, if class actions are blocked,
consumers will not bring lawsuits and cannot recoup their accident losses
ex post. Although class actions generate monetary benefits for injured consumers ex post, the consumers as a group are worse off from an ex ante
perspective. If the firm allowed class actions to proceed, the firm would
need to build the possibility of liability and the cost of litigation into the
price of the product. When class actions are allowed, the price will rise.
Since litigation is costly, involving significant transactions costs, those costs
would be jointly borne by the firms and the consumers. Thus, in Figure 2,
the firm’s decision to block class actions by requiring consumers to sign
class action waivers is socially desirable.
Conversely, if individual lawsuits have a PEV, and class actions allow
economies of scale and lower the per-plaintiff litigation cost, the firm

27.
Polinsky and Shavell have argued that when there is a robust market and regulatory
monitoring over product safety, product liability regime becomes unnecessary. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV . 1437, 144353 (2010). Baker and Choi examine how a liability regime can help when the market mechanism
is imperfect. See generally Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly
Legal Sanctions Can Work Better than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2018) (analyzing how reputational sanctions interact with legal sanctions). Schwartz argues that absent market failures, consumer sovereignty should be the prevailing norm. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-68 (1988).
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would have a private incentive to allow class actions.28 Requiring consumers to sign class action waivers would of course block class actions but
would not stop litigation. Instead, a class action waiver would force the injured plaintiffs to substitute away from low-cost class actions towards
higher-cost individual lawsuits. Anticipating the need to defend against
costly individual lawsuits, the firm costs would rise by more than $10.29 In
addition, insofar as consumers can foresee being plaintiffs in future litigation, their demand for the product would fall by more than $10. With individual rather than class actions, the firm’s profits, consumer surplus, and
social welfare would all fall in tandem. Thus, similar to the benchmark example, the firm has a private incentive to allow class actions, and allowing
class actions benefits consumers and is socially desirable.
2. Moral Hazard
So far, we have assumed that the firm does not face any kind of moral
hazard or commitment problem. If products are experience or credence
goods and other enforcement mechanisms (such as market or regulatory
sanctions) are not working well, firms have an economic interest in assuring consumers that the products are as represented and are safe. For example, a restaurant chain or a food processor would like to assure consumers that their food products are safe and uncontaminated and will not cause
illness. Similarly, durable equipment manufacturers would like to assure
consumers that their products will function properly under normal conditions. Liability is a mechanism by which firms can “bond” themselves and
solve the moral hazard problems. By doing so, so long as the consumers
have sufficient foresight and sophistication, the firms would increase the
potential plaintiffs’ willingness to pay (i.e., increase the surplus from the
transaction) and also be able to realize a larger profit. Allowing class proceedings may be privately and socially optimal in these circumstances.30

28.
Class action litigation may lead to higher per-plaintiff litigation costs. Although
plaintiffs can avoid duplication when they consolidate their claims, plaintiffs also have a joint incentive to spend more money in the litigation contest. Specifically, combining many small lawsuits
into one consolidated claim magnifies the stakes in the litigation and can stimulate more litigation
spending on both sides. Firms would have a stronger incentive to block class actions in this case.
See generally David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the
Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305 (2014).
29.
Suppose that the cost of individual litigation is $800 per unit for the firm and the
consumer. Then, the demand curve would shift down by $80 and the marginal cost curve would
shift up by $80. The price would be $300 and the producer surplus and consumer surplus would be
$400 and $200, respectively.
30.
Not all consumer and employment contracts include class action waivers. CARLTON
FIELDS, supra note 2. Recently, some firms have stopped requiring employees to submit disputes
to individual arbitration. See, e.g., Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Ends Forced Arbitration for All
Employee Disputes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/technology/google-forced-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/ZJF2-AY5S].
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These ideas may be illustrated by extending our benchmark example.
We now consider a moral hazard problem where product safety or reliability, along with the firm’s investment to reduce accidents, is unobserved by
consumers at the time of sale. As before, consumers are sophisticated and
correctly perceive the incentive problems and the potential product risks:
the firm’s marginal manufacturing cost is $100, and the harm caused by an
accident is $1,000. But now there is an opportunity for the firm to make the
product safer or more reliable: by spending an additional $20 per unit,31
thus raising the manufacturing cost from $100 to $120, the probability of
harm falls from 10% to 4%, reducing the average or expected harm per
unit from $100 to $40.32 Notice that this investment is socially desirable,
since reduction in harm, $100 ‒ $40 = $60, is greater than the incremental
cost of $20.

Figure 3. Moral Hazard

First, suppose that the firm accepts products liability, and does not
require consumers to sign class action waivers. As in the previous example,
assume that the cost of class action litigation is $100 for each consumer and
the firm, whereas the cost of individual litigation is prohibitively high. Suppose the firm allows class actions and also makes the investment to reduce
the probability of accident from 10% to 4%. Suppose further that consumers expect the firm to make the investment, and they expect to receive
compensatory damages through the class action mechanism. As shown in
Figure 3A, each consumer’s willingness to pay will be reduced by $4, which
is their expected cost of litigation. With the lower probability of harm, the
firm’s marginal cost is $100 + $20 + (0.04)($1,000 + $100) = $164. The firm
31.
In reality, investment in safety may be done on a lump-sum basis (e.g., through research and development). We use the per-product cost assumption to preserve the constant marginal cost and to make the analysis simple.
32.
For simplicity, we assume that the firm posts its price first before the firm and the
consumers make their decisions on investment and purchase. This removes the possibility of using
price to signal investment.
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charges P = $280 and earns profits of $13,456 and consumer surplus is
$6,728.33 As above, the firm captures two thirds of the social surplus and
the consumers capture one third.34
Now suppose instead that the firm imposes a class action waiver on
consumers and the consumers find it prohibitively costly to bring individual lawsuits against the firm. Given that the consumers do not observe the
safety or reliability of the product at the time of sale, with a class action
waiver, the firm has no incentive to invest the additional $20 to reduce the
probability of accidents.35 So, the firm’s marginal cost of production is $100
as shown in Figure 3B. Consumers are sophisticated and understand that
products are unsafe and cause accidents 10% of the time, and that their
future losses will not be compensated. This is reflected in the demand curve
in Figure 3B. As in the benchmark, the firm charges P = $200 and earns
profits of $10,000 and consumer surplus is $5,000. Importantly, both firms
and consumers are better off when class actions are allowed. The extra surplus created when class actions are allowed, $20,184 ‒ $15,000 = $5,184 in
this example, is shared by the firm and the consumers.
The examples have shown that if class action generates significant social benefits—in particular, if it solves the problem of firm moral hazard,
firms themselves may have a private incentive to allow class actions.36 If
the net benefits from improvements in product safety or reliability (the reduction in the harms to consumers minus the incremental cost of producing
better products) is higher than the expected costs of litigation, firm profits,
consumer surplus, and social welfare are all higher when class actions are
allowed. When firm profits and consumer surplus rise and fall in tandem,
as illustrated in the examples above, the firm’s private incentives to impose
class action waivers and the social incentives are aligned.

B. Private and Social Incentives Not Aligned
There are several settings where the firms’ private incentives to block
class actions are socially excessive. In general, misalignments between the
firms’ private incentives and the social incentives may arise when the threat
of class action litigation increases the size of the transactional or social surplus, but the additional value created is captured by the consumers at the
33.
The firm is strictly better off making the investment. Without the investment, the
firm’s marginal cost rises to $100 + (0.10)($1,100) = $210 > $164, reducing the firm’s profit.
34.
The total surplus is $6,728 + $13,456 = $20,184.
35.
More precisely, without any ex post liability, given that the consumers do not observe
the safety or reliability of the product nor the firm’s investment at the time of purchase, conditional
on any price, the firm has an incentive to deviate and make no investment. In equilibrium, the firm
makes no additional investment and the consumers, rationally expecting this, become willing to
pay a lower price for the product.
36.
The example assumes strict liability. Similar results would be obtained under the negligence standard where the firm will not be found liable if investment is made and consumers do
not observe the firm’s investment choice at the time of purchase.
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expense of the firms. In these circumstances, firms will attempt to block
class actions and the social surplus will fall. As we will see, such problems
may arise when consumers systematically misperceive the risk or the impact of waiving their rights to bring class actions. Such problems also arise
when competitors get together and collude to fix prices above competitive
levels. A similar misalignment arises when employers have market power
and “squeeze” employees and lower the wages or other employee benefits
for the purpose of maximizing profit. Still other (somewhat more subtle)
misalignments occur when adverse selection is present: in a (more socially
desirable) pooling equilibrium, certain consumer groups can be subsidizing
others and this creates an incentive for the firms to engage in “cream-skimming” so as to grab a larger surplus from the subsidizing group.
1. Consumer Misperceptions
Distortions may arise when consumers misperceive the impact of signing a class action waiver or are simply unaware of the existence of the
clause. Indeed, it is well documented that consumers fail to read the fine
print in the contracts that they sign.37 So, as a consequence, we might not
expect the inclusion or omission of a class action waiver to meaningfully
change the consumers’ willingness to pay for the product or the quantity
demanded in the market. When consumers’ willingness to pay for the product is relatively invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of a class action
waiver, firms cannot capture the social benefits of class action litigation
and are therefore more likely to require class action waivers as a cost-saving measure. As a consequence, firms will have inadequate incentives to
make cost-justified investments to improve product safety.38
We now illustrate these ideas by extending the moral hazard example
from above. Suppose that whether the firm includes a class-action waiver
or not, consumers mistakenly believe that the firm will take due care when
designing and producing the products and that, in the event of a harm, they
will be compensated for the loss.39 Thus, the consumers’ willingness to pay
for the product remains unaffected by the class action waiver. Figure 4 extends the moral hazard example to reflect this new situation. Figure 4A,
which is identical to Figure 3A, shows the market outcome when class actions are allowed. Following the logic outlined above, firms will make the

See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, & Trossen, supra note 14.
Similar distortions arise when consumers systematically underestimate product risks.
See generally Koichi Hamada, Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Product Liability, 66
AM. ECON . REV. 228 (1976); Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and
Producer Liability, 44 REV. E CON. STUD. 561 (1977).
39.
In other settings, consumers might believe that they will never be compensated for
their losses. In that case, the firm would have no incentive to allow class actions (remove a class
action waiver), because it would expose the firm to liability without any corresponding benefits
(consumer demand would not change).
37.
38.
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safety investment and each firm’s marginal cost of production is $164, consisting of $100 manufacturing cost, $20 of safety investment, and $44 of expected cost of litigation (0.04)($1,000 + $100).40 The firm charges P = $280,
sells 116 units and realizes $13,456 in profits.

Figure 4. Consumer Misperceptions

Figure 4B shows the market outcome when the firm requires consumers to sign a class action waiver and the consumers are unaware of the
waiver’s effects. Since consumers are unaware of the waiver, their gross
willingness to pay is unchanged, so the demand curve in Figure 4B (the
higher downward sloping line) is exactly the same as in Figure 4A when
class actions are allowed. However, the firm has no incentive to invest in
product safety and so the marginal cost of production is just $100, the manufacturing cost, just as in Figure 3B. The firm charges P = $248, sells 148
units and realizes profits of $21,904. Interestingly, if consumers were aware
of the waiver and its implications, their gross willingness to pay for the
product would be considerably less (the lower downward sloping line in
Figure 4B). As a consequence, consumers in the range of [52, 148] along
the horizontal axis are paying more for the product than it is actually worth
to them! This is because consumers misperceive the risks and purchase the
product even though they should not. As shown in Figure 4B, consumers,
in the aggregate, are obtaining a consumer surplus of negative $3,256.41
In Figure 4, the private incentive of the firm to block class actions is
socially excessive. By requiring consumers to waive their right to a class
action, the firm can take advantage of consumer misperception and lower
their expected marginal cost from $164 to $100 and raise their profits from
40.
If a firm were to not make the safety investment, its expected marginal cost will, instead, be $210, consisting of $100 of manufacturing cost plus $110 from litigation (0.1)($1,000 +
$100).
41.
Notice that the firm has no incentive to tell consumers the truth. Many products liability lawsuits allege that firms failed to disclose product risks to consumers.
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$13,924 to $21,904. While consumers may think that they are better off with
a class action waiver, since they are paying $32 less, the lower price is
swamped by the uncompensated loss: consumer surplus falls from $6,728
to ‒$3,256. The total surplus in Figure 4B is $21,904 ‒ $3,256 = $18,648,
which is lower than the total surplus when class actions are allowed in Figure 4A, $13,456 + $6,728 = $20,184.
In this example, producer surplus and consumer surplus do not rise
and fall in tandem. Class actions are efficient from a social perspective but
reduce the firm’s profits. By blocking class actions, the firm extracts value
from the consumers and creates a large social loss. With consumer misperceptions, the firm’s private decision to block class actions creates market
distortions and causes social harm.
2. Private Antitrust Litigation
Firms may require consumers to waive their right to bring class actions
to immunize themselves against private antitrust litigation. When public
enforcement of the antitrust laws is less-than-fully effective and class actions are blocked, firms may engage in anticompetitive conduct that raises
firm profits but reduces consumer surplus and social welfare.42
Let us reconsider our benchmark example where the marginal production cost is $100. In contrast to our earlier example, we will assume that
the product is perfectly safe and never causes accidents. So, products liability is not an issue. There are however antitrust concerns. Specifically, we
can imagine that the product is sold not by a monopolist but by a cartel of
identical firms. We will assume that public enforcement is weak and individual litigation is not viable, so if consumers sign class action waivers,
firms will fix the price at the monopoly level without any risk of lawsuits.
This is shown in Figure 5B, where the price that maximizes cartel profits is
$250, producer surplus is $22,500, and consumer surplus is $11,250. In contrast, if there is no class action waiver, then consumers may be able to bring
private antitrust lawsuits against the firms for the overcharge, that is the
price charged by the cartel minus the “but for” competitive price of $100.
We assume that litigation is costly, where the cost (measured per unit) of
bringing an antitrust class action is $50. As shown in Figure 5A, the feasibility of litigation will discipline the firms to charge $150 instead of $250.
When the price P = $150, consumers are (just) unwilling to pursue private
antitrust litigation because the lawsuit does not have PEV.43

42.
This Section is based on Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation, 12 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS (forthcoming 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329316 [https://perma.cc/94SG-7DGL].
43.
This example assumes that consumers always win at trial and receive compensatory
damages for the overcharge. If consumers received treble damages but won with a probability of
33% the results would be the same.
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Figure 5. Private Antitrust Litigation

Figures 5A and 5B show that allowing class actions is socially efficient.
The threat of private antitrust litigation disciplines the firms to reduce their
prices from $250 to $150, stimulating demand for the product and creating
a much larger social surplus, $43,750 versus $34,750. But note that when
class actions are allowed, the consumers capture more than two thirds of
the total surplus, and the firms get less than one third. The firms have a
strong incentive to block private antitrust lawsuits, since this allows the
firms to charge higher prices and producer surplus rises by $22,500 ‒
$12,500 = $10,000. Of course, this causes consumer surplus to fall by an
even larger amount, $31,250 ‒ $11,250 = $20,000. Requiring consumers to
sign class action waivers as a condition of sale allows the firms to capture a
much larger share of a smaller pie.
In the products liability setting (and without consumer misperception), as the firms made a safety investment, it increased the consumers’
willingness to pay and social welfare, and the firms were able to capture a
significant amount of the increase in social welfare by charging a higher
price. In this antitrust setting, by contrast, social welfare would increase
when the firms charge a price that is close to their marginal cost. By doing
so, however, all of that increase goes to the consumers and this undermines
the firms’ incentive to choose the optimal deterrence regime.
3. Monopsonist Employer
The flipside of firms’ attempting to extract monopoly rent through
price fixing is when a firm has too much market power as the purchaser of
inputs. Imagine an employer that enjoys monopsony power in the labor
market. As in the products liability setting, in this setting, we can represent
the market in a graph with wages on the vertical axis and the employment
level on the horizontal axis. In Figure 6, the labor demand curve is given as
the downward sloping line that depicts the inverse relationship between
559
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the wage and the quantity while the upward sloping line shows the labor
supply curve. We use the concept of “wage” as somewhat loosely to include
not just the monetary compensation, but also other employee benefits,
such as fringe benefits, non-hostile and non-discriminatory work environment, workplace safety, etc.
Suppose labor regulations mandate that the monopsonist employer
must pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits such that the workers’ total monetized compensation is $15 per hour.44 We assume that, notwithstanding the mandate, public enforcement mechanisms are insufficient, but
the employees may bring private lawsuits against the employer for violations. In Figure 6A, if the employees are able to bring costless class actions
against the monopsonist employer, the monopsonist will pay $15 an hour
and the equilibrium maximizes social welfare. The employer will realize
the surplus of $112.5 (represented by the light gray triangle at top) while
the employees, as a group, also realize the surplus of $112.5. If the employer attempts to reduce the compensation to a level below $15, the employees will be able to bring a class action against the employer and force
the employer to either compensate the employees or, through injunction,
pay $15 per hour.

Figure 6. Monopsonist Employer

But, of course, this is not the ideal outcome for the monopsonist. By
conditioning employment on the signing of a class action waiver, the monopsonist can reduce the total compensation for the employees and capture a larger surplus. With the assumption, as in the benchmark case, that
individual litigation is prohibitively costly, employees will no longer be
able to receive compensation through litigation. This is depicted in Figure
6B. With a class action waiver, the monopsonist can reduce the total hourly
44.
This is the “socially optimal” wage (it maximizes the sum of worker and firm surplus).
In practice, regulators may not have the information necessary to do this.
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compensation down to say $10 and realize a profit of $150, instead of
$112.5. The employees’ surplus decreases to $50 while this exercise of monopsony power also creates a deadweight loss (since at $10, the marginal
product of labor is $20). If the monopsonist is given a choice, it will choose
the latter regime with no class actions, and this is socially inefficient.
The reason why the monopsonist’s incentive is not aligned with maximizing social welfare is the flipside of our earlier price-fixing example.
Suppose we are in regime 6B, with the equilibrium compensation of $10
per hour. If the monopsonist were to marginally increase the compensation, say, to $11, while the total social surplus increases (the deadweight
loss shrinks), all of that increase would be captured by the employees and
not the monopsonist-employer. Unless the monopsonist can engage in perfect wage discrimination, with a single wage, there is no way for the monopsonist to capture the increase in social welfare. The monopsonist’s incentive of choosing the optimal litigation regime is misaligned with the
social objective.45
III. Further Considerations
The benchmark case in Part I and the illustrative examples in Part II
have relied on a variety of simplifying assumptions. Once we take into account more realistic issues, such as adverse selection and agency problems
within class actions, the analysis becomes more complex, but the main
theme of identifying circumstances in which the private and the social incentives diverge or converge will remain more or less the same. Rather
than trying to present additional analytical examples, in this section we discuss these complexities more informally.

A. Consumer Risk Aversion
Our core insights continue to hold if consumers are risk averse. In the
examples above, the consumer was assumed to be risk neutral: the monetized disutility associated with a 10% chance of accident that would cause
harm of $1,000 was exactly $100. In reality, people are typically risk averse
in the sense that a person would pay more than $100 to avoid a 10% chance
of a $1,000 loss. Indeed, risk aversion is probably the most important reason why people buy insurance policies and seek to diversify their retirement portfolios.
If consumers are risk averse—and do not have access to competitive
insurance markets—then strict liability may be an efficient mechanism for
shifting risk away from the risk averse consumers towards firms who are in
45.
CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 2, at 23 (“[S]ixty-seven percent of companies report
that they faced at least one labor and employment class action within the last five years.”). Issues
include wage and hour disputes, contractor misclassifications, and data privacy.
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a better position to diversify that risk. When strict liability is socially efficient, then absent the conflating factors of consumer misperceptions discussed above, it is in the mutual interest of firms and consumers to mitigate
the risk borne by consumers. Let us reconsider the benchmark example in
Figure 1. If class actions are allowed, then consumers are fully insured
against future losses and the outcome is exactly as in Figure 1A. The total
surplus of $15,000 is divided between the firm and the consumers with the
firm receiving two thirds. If class actions are blocked and individual litigation is not viable, then the risk averse consumers suffer an expected loss of
more than $100. When class actions are blocked, consumers are exposed
to risk and so the demand curve in Figure 1B would be lower than before;
the firm would lower its price, sell fewer units, and firm profits and consumer surplus would fall.

B. Agency Problems, Cy Pres Relief, and Frivolous Litigation
When class actions are plagued by the problems of agency or open the
floodgates for potentially frivolous litigation,46 firms would be more inclined to impose a class action waiver. Class actions are de facto controlled
by lawyers who may pursue their individual objectives rather than the wellbeing of the class members. Especially when the class size is large and there
is no plaintiff with a sizable claim, class members may have little or no incentive to engage in costly monitoring of the lawyer representing the class,
and judicial oversight is arguably insufficient. Class action lawyers can capture the value that would otherwise go to the consumers ex post. Moreover,
when the per-plaintiff recoveries are small it is common for the litigation
funds to remain unclaimed and, in many cases, the funds are distributed to
charities and non-profit organizations (so called “cy pres” relief).47 Then,
class actions operate as an ad valorem tax on the product. Firms must raise
the price to cover the expected payments to lawyers and third parties, and
this reduces producer and consumer surplus. Insofar as class actions create
a “sink” where value is captured by lawyers and third parties ex post,
blocking class actions benefits consumers and producers (although lawyers
and third parties may suffer the loss of rents).
Class action waivers may or may not be socially desirable in this setting. While the rents captured by lawyers and third parties may be viewed
as a simple transfer of value, there is an important social cost from rent
seeking. As the rents get larger, the price of the product rises, the quantity

46.
Frivolous litigants may include parties who suffered no harm and bring lawsuits for
their settlement value.
47.
See generally Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617 (2010). BRIAN T.
FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS A CTIONS (2019) argues that frivolous class
actions are rare and that 80 to 85% of monies paid in class action settlements go to class members.
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sold falls, and the deadweight loss grows.48 On the other hand, rent seeking
by lawyers and third parties could have positive deterrence benefits, as
firms take greater precautions to avoid future litigation. In this setting, the
firms’ private incentive to block class actions through class action waivers
may be socially excessive. The firm and the consumers do not internalize
the benefits to third parties from class action litigation, and therefore might
tolerate more product defects than are socially desirable.

C. Adverse Selection
In the numerical examples, we have assumed that each consumer’s
propensity of suffering harm was the same. Once we relax this assumption
and impose a more realistic possibility that there could be some heterogeneity among consumers regarding their propensity of suffering harm—for
example, by allowing for a possible adverse selection—aligning social and
private incentives with respect to class actions becomes generally more difficult. We briefly mention two possibilities here.
The first possibility is potential “cream-skimming” through a suboptimal liability provision. Suppose that consumers are heterogeneous and
have private information about the likelihood that they will suffer accidents, and that when competitive firms take precautions, the likelihood of
accident falls for both consumer types. There is a moral-hazard problem in
that the firm’s precautions are not observed at the time of sale. Class actions are socially efficient, because they give the firms the incentive to take
the cost-justified precautions. However, some firms have an incentive to
disallow class actions and charge a lower price. They do this in order to
select (cream-skim) the low risk consumers. So, the private incentive to
block class actions may be socially excessive.49
Another possibility is when a monopolist attempts to price-discriminate among different types of consumers. Suppose that consumers are heterogeneous, where the willingness to pay for a product is positively correlated with the likelihood of an accident (as may be the case with intensity
of use). Note that liability is a mechanism for the consumers to get ex post
“rebates” on their purchases, and the high-value consumer types get higher
average rebates since they have accidents more frequently. So, if the firm
48.
This is true even if lawyers and third parties are part of the social welfare calculation.
Suppose in Figure 1A that the lawyer and third parties capture the benefits of litigation rather
than the consumers themselves—the accident losses are uncompensated. The demand curve in
Figure 1A will shift down by $100 and cross the vertical axis at $300. With a marginal cost of $200,
the firm will charge a price of P = $250 and sell just 50 units of the good. Firm profits are $2,500,
consumer surplus is half this amount or $1,250, and the lawyer/third party surplus is $5,000. The
total surplus is $8,750, significantly less than the $15,000 total surplus in Figure 1A.
49.
This adverse selection problem was highlighted in our earlier work. See Albert H.
Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product
Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection, 30 J.L. E CON. & ORG. 734 (2014); see also Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 957 (2010).
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allows class actions, the firm is giving higher rebates to consumers who
were all-else-equal willing to pay more for the product. So, liability is subsidizing the wrong consumers. Therefore, the firm will block class actions
because by blocking lawsuits the firm can better price discriminate. Blocking class actions in this context is socially inefficient. When the firm blocks
class actions, it chooses the product safety level that is optimal for the marginal consumer. The marginal consumer is someone who suffers accidents
relatively infrequently. Therefore, product safety is insufficient.50
Conclusion
Building on the existing law and economics literature with a series of
illustrative examples, this Essay has analyzed conditions under which private firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers may or may not be
aligned with maximizing social welfare. The issue of whether class action
waiver provisions should be enforced has come to the fore through a series
of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases and this Essay has attempted to provide a more nuanced, policy-based understanding of that question. While
the focus has been private versus social incentive to allow class actions, this
certainly isn’t the only salient issue involving class action mechanisms. In
this Conclusion, we highlight a few additional avenues for future research.
The first unresolved question involves unforeseen contingencies. The
analytical frameworks described in this paper were premised on the litigation risks being foreseen by the market. When requiring consumers or employees to sign class action waivers, the firms fully understood the implications of their choices, and could weigh the pros and cons of the contractual
options. The COVID-19 pandemic, which was unforeseen by the market,
creates new challenges for both the practice and theory of law. In the first
half of 2020 alone, about 500 COVID-19 related class actions were filed in
a variety of industries and many companies are reporting increases in litigation activity.51 For example, so-called “business interruption” cases have
been brought against insurance companies that deny coverage for businesses that had to close due to various restrictions;52 “refund class actions”
have been brought by students against universities for not delivering the
contracted services;53 and workers have brought actions with grievances
50.
See generally Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, Contracts, and Liability, 51 RAND J. E CON. 233 (2020). Blocking class actions also exacerbates the moral hazard problem, further compromising product safety.
51.
70% of companies surveyed expected an increase in class action litigation and virtually none expected a decline. CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 2, at 7.
52.
See, e.g., Troy Stacy Enters. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-00312 (S.D. Ohio filed
Apr. 19, 2020); Milkboy Ctr. City LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-02036 (E.D. Pa. filed
Apr. 27, 2020).
53.
Some students allege that the quality of online education falls far short of what they
could get on campus. See, e.g., Pfingsten v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., No. 2:20-cv-00716 (W.D. Pa.
filed May 15, 2020). In another refund class action filing, baseball fans have attempted to bring a
class action against StubHub and Ticketmaster seeking refunds for Major League Baseball tickets.
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over how their employers handled the crisis.54 In contrast to cases where
future contingencies are reasonably foreseen, when class action waivers are
forbidding potential plaintiffs from bringing class actions based on unforeseen contingencies, this throws a new complexity over the question of enforceability.
Another issue that needs more in-depth examination is that of class
certification: determining the boundaries of the class. Our framework has
assumed that whether a certain plaintiff has suffered injury and whether
the plaintiff belongs in the class can be determined relatively easily. In
practice, however, the problem of determining the boundaries of the class
and class certification may be far from straightforward. Resolving this issue
can be quite challenging, for instance, in the case of securities class actions.
When class action plaintiffs allege that they suffered a loss by a company’s
misrepresentation, since the U.S. Supreme Court case of Halliburton,55 the
defendant-company can rebut the class certification by showing that the
securities market wasn’t sufficiently informationally efficient and the alleged misrepresentation did not cause mispricing of the security. Similar
issues can arise in product liability settings when a defendant firm tries to
show that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was caused by some other factor. Drawing the right boundaries will have a significant effect on forestalling frivolous claims and overall deterrence against firms. The issues of
unforeseen contingencies and class certification, just to highlight a few,
raise many interesting questions that remain on the law and economics research agenda.

See Ajzenman v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 2:20-cv-03643 (C.D. Cal. filed April 20,
2020).
54.
Employees of Celebrity Cruise Lines have brought suit alleging that they were forced
to remain onboard the vessel without pay when the industry was shut down. See Maglana v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., No. 1:20-cv-22133 (S.D. Fla. filed May 21, 2020).
55.
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014). Recently, Judge
Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York rejected the settlement proposal between Harvey Weinstein and dozens of women who have accused him of sexual harassment and abuse. In
the process, the judge expressed skepticism as to whether the claims should belong in the same
class and whether the plaintiffs should pursue individual actions. See Jodi Kantor & Megan
Twohey, Judge, Expressing Skepticism, Upends $25 Million Harvey Weinstein Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/harvey-weinstein-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/LN4V-5YMX].
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